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1. THE PROBLEM: FREEDOM TO PHILOSOPHIZE
The first part of the subtitle of the Theological Political Treatise may have been 
easily acceptable to Spinoza’s contemporaries: the book shows that “Freedom of 
Philosophizing can be allowed in Preserving Piety and the Peace of the Republic.”1 
In the aftermath of the Reformation, this sentiment would not have been 
unfamiliar. The secular ideal of the separation of Ecclesiastical from temporal 
authority requires that there is a division between the inner self that is subject to 
faith and receives the message of Scripture, and the external self, who is subject 
to the authority of the sovereign and to the laws of the state.2 Mirroring this logic, 
philosophers and deists of various hues claim a private right to the freedom to 
philosophize—a right that is distinct from their obligations to the state and which 
the first part of the subtitle ably presents.
The second part of the subtitle would have come, however, as a surprise to the 
general educated reader in the seventeenth century. The book, indicates Spinoza, 
also wants to argue that “it is not possible for such Freedom to be upheld except 
when accompanied by the Peace of the Republic and Piety Themselves.” Here, 
the freedom to philosophize acquires a public dimension. It is as if Spinoza is 
suggesting that the freedom to philosophize is a necessary precondition for a well-
functioning state and for a pious Church.3 The absence of such a freedom, then, 
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would threaten the existence of a state and would make the Church impious. It is 
as if—to put it bluntly—the freedom to philosophize not only bridges the divide 
between private and public, but it also becomes the condition of the possibility of 
public liberty. Such a collapse of the distinction between the inside and the outside 
challenges authority, both the ecclesiastical authority that relies on internal faith, 
and the temporal authority that relies on the obedience of the law.4
I want to show that Spinoza’s conception of freedom that does not rely on a division 
of an inside and an outside is intricately linked with the dialectic of authority and 
utility that characterizes his Epicureanism. Let me sketch what I mean by this 
dialectic, as I presented it elsewhere.5 Authority or auctoritas has a specific range of 
signification in Latin that is much narrower than in modern English. It asserts the 
entity that is beyond dispute, or that is impervious to argumentation.6 As Spinoza 
puts it, “the authority of the prophets does not permit of argumentation [prophetae 
auctoritas ratiocinari non patitur]” (139/152). The calculation of utility refers to the 
human propensity to make practical judgments in the course of acting. On the 
one hand, there is a conflict between authority that calls for obedience, and the 
calculation of utility that one fulfils by judging for oneself. To do what you are 
told and to calculate what is the most advantageous action are two contradictory 
ways of acting. On the other hand, this does not establish an exclusion between 
authority and utility because it may be advantageous to obey. Differently put, one 
may calculate that one’s utility is better served by suspending their calculation 
and following someone else’s lead.
Explaining the crosscurrents between Spinoza’s thought and Epicureanism 
around freedom and the dialectic of authority and utility will help us make sense 
of the enigmatic use of the “freedom to philosophize” in the subtitle of the 
Theological Political Treatise. I am only concerned to present these crosscurrents 
here, not to outline the entire theory of freedom in Spinoza. To achieve my aim, I 
will first look at the connection between fear and practical judgment in Epicurus; 
I will then turn to Lucretius’s contribution in both developing the concepts of 
authority and history; and finally I will show how freedom and the dialectic of 
authority and utility inform the most famous passage from the Preface of the 
Treatise discussing voluntary servitude.
I underscore that the discussion here is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis 
of freedom in the Theological Political Treatise or in Spinoza as a whole. The scope 
of the present article is more modest: it highlights how elements of ancient 
epicureanism inform the presentation of freedom in the Preface of the Treatise.7
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2. “A FREE MAN THINKS OF NOTHING LESS THAN OF DEATH…”: FEAR 
AND FREEDOM IN EPICURUS
The difficulty in adumbrating the connection between freedom and the dialectic 
of authority and utility is that it is hard to identify a definition of freedom in 
Spinoza’s works. Nowhere in the Theological Political Treatise can we find an 
explicit definition of freedom. If we turn to his other major work, the Ethics, the 
difficulties compound. Part V of the Ethics may be about human freedom, but 
freedom as such is not defined there. 
The closest that Spinoza comes to a definition of freedom is Proposition 67 of 
Part IV: “A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a 
meditation on life, not on death.” This is an unusual definition of freedom, 
one that does not provide us with a prima facie description of what we would 
have expected freedom to be. More damagingly, as soon as we start interpreting 
Proposition 67, we are quickly led to contradictions and paradoxes: If we interpret 
it in terms of one’s personal overcoming of the fear of death, freedom’s political 
aspect recedes in the background reinstating the division between the inside and 
the outside—which is precisely what we thought that the freedom to philosophize 
overcomes. And as soon as the protection from death is delegated to a sovereign, 
Spinoza would require a strong sense of authority aligning his position with that 
of Thomas Hobbes.8 How is it possible to understand Spinoza’s conception of 
freedom without presupposing either individualism or authoritarianism?
It is notable that the opening of the Theological Political Treatise is concerned with 
fear, specifically with how people become “prey to superstition [superstitione]” 
through fear (1/5). Spinoza observes that humans are under the sway of “fortune’s 
fickle favours,” which makes them “wretched victims of alternating hopes and fears 
[spem metumque]” (1/5). It is for this reason that fear “engenders, preserves and 
fosters superstition” (2). Everybody is subject to fear and hence to superstition. 
If that is true for the common people—Spinoza quotes Curtius saying that 
“the multitude has no ruler more potent then superstition”—it is also true for 
exceptional and powerful individuals such as Alexander the Great, who, in hard 
times, turns to oracles—“that mockery of human wisdom,” according to Curtius, 
whom Spinoza quotes again (2). This is a significant example—the first one in 
the Treatise. It suggests the futility of a task to “enlighten” ourselves as foolproof 
protection against superstition. If such a great individual as Alexander is prey to 
fear and superstition, we may be better served recognizing that we will always be 
subject to passions and that reason on its own will not liberate us. Is there maybe, 
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then, a link between the enslaving function of fear and the conception of freedom 
as overcoming the fear of death?
The above question allows us to turn to Epicureanism. Let me start by sketching 
the position. The importance of the overcoming of the fear of death is something 
of a commonplace in Epicureanism. The famous “tetrapharmakon” or the “fourfold 
remedy” that summarizes the first four of Epicurus’s principal doctrines devotes 
the first two to the overcoming of fear: “Fear not the gods/ Fear not death.”9 This 
entire discourse about overcoming fear culminates in the fear of dying, since death 
provokes the strongest emotional reaction. Fear overwhelms us with emotions and 
thereby curtails our capacity to make practical judgments that lead to freedom. It 
works in the opposite direction too: as Epicurus puts is, when we are “altogether 
free from the fear of death,” our actions can be free and not dependent on any 
authority (ἀδέσποτον, X.133).10 
The key to helps us make sense of the definition of freedom in Proposition 67 of 
Part IV of the Ethics in conjunction with the discourse on fear in the Theological 
Political Treatise is the calculation of utility—the third epicurean theme. According 
to Epicurus, phronesis is the precondition of any virtue and any good (X.132). We 
will see here that freedom is understood as the operation of phronesis, where 
this operation also mobilizes the other two themes of Spinoza’s epicureanism. 
Epicurus contributes on how to conceive the co-articulation of monism and 
phronesis, whereas Lucretius contribution—as we will see in the next section—
is to delineate the first epicurean theme—the construction of authority through 
fear—in relation to instrumental rationality.
Phronesis in Epicurus is best grasped by noting first how he radicalizes Aristotle’s 
position. In Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes between 
scientific knowledge or episteme and practical knowledge or phronesis.11 The 
main characteristic of scientific knowledge is that its causes are necessary 
because it refers to unchanging things (1139a-b). To put this point differently, 
scientific knowledge is universal. By contrast, practical knowledge is concerned 
with contingent things. As such, it relies on rational calculation (τὸ λογιστικόν, 
1139a). Phronesis in particular is concerned with calculating or judging how 
one can achieve a good life (τὸ εὖ ζῆν, 1139b). This is why Aristotle describes 
phronesis as concerned with calculating means and ends relations and as the kind 
of knowledge that pertains to the political.12 
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Aristotle summarizes his distinction between scientific knowledge and 
instrumental rationality as follows: “Phronesis is concerned with the affairs of 
men, and with things that can be the object of deliberation. … But no one deliberates 
about things that cannot vary, nor yet about things that are not a means to some 
end” (1141b). The lack of deliberation and instrumentality characterizes the one 
who practices scientific knowledge, the one who will be described later in the 
history of thought as a removed, objective observer. The one who has phronesis 
or the one who exercises practical knowledge is never conceived as removed. 
The reason is simple: “Thought by itself moves nothing” (1139a). Thought does 
not lead to action—it is not practical—unless it accompanied by emotion or 
desire. Significantly, for Aristotle this relation between thought and action in the 
operation of phronesis is not a hierarchical one. It can be either a thought coupled 
with desire or desire accompanied by thought (1139b). The starting point can be 
either, but for phronesis to be possible there must be a balance between the two—
neither emotion can overwhelm thought, nor vice versa. This is an important point 
never questioned by Epicurus who otherwise significantly departs from Aristotle.
When Epicurus writes that phronesis is the precondition of the ends of human 
life and it is “the beginning and rule of everything [πάντων ἀρχὴ] and the greatest 
good [τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν]” as well as “the cause of all virtues [ἐξ ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ 
πᾶσαι πεφύκασιν ἀρεταί]” and hence “more significant [τιμιώτερον] even than 
philosophy” (X.132), he effectively rejects the separation of theory and praxis and 
thereby turns Aristotle’s hierarchy of knowledge on its head. Suddenly phronesis 
emerges as the primary form of knowledge. Let us turn to Epicurus’s letter 
to Herodotus, his most detailed account of a theory of knowledge, to see why 
Epicurus places so much emphasis on phronesis.
Epicurus begins by stressing what knowledge of nature is for, specifically, for 
peaceful and calm life (X.37). He explains at this point that there are two sources 
of knowledge, either directly through perceptions, or indirectly through words 
that communicate experiences. But for this empirical conception of knowledge to 
be possible, Epicurus asserts that it is required to assume regularity in nature. He 
summarizes this position by saying that “nothing is created out of nothing” (X.38). 
The rejection of the possibility of creation ex nihilo was prevalent amongst the 
“physiologists” who tried to explain nature in material terms.13 For instance, the 
same view was held by Democritus, the atomist who greatly influenced Epicurus.14 
Significantly, Epicurus recognizes that the rejection of creation ex nihilo can be 
expressed in terms of totality: “There is nothing outside the totality [τὸ πᾶν]—
nothing that can enter the totality in order to change it” (X.39).15 The recognition 
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that the rejection of creation ex nihilo entails a totality outside of which nothing 
exists essentially asserts that knowledge is possible on condition that there are no 
divine interventions that change the laws of nature.16 Or, knowledge presupposes 
a complete or unchanging totality.
The affinities with Spinoza’s monism are clear. The opening of the Ethics consists 
in a repetition and defense of this Epicurean insight about totality. Substance, 
Spinoza’s word for this totality, “cannot be produced by anything else” is how 
Proposition 6 of Part I of the Ethics puts it. The totality of substance or God is also 
a key position of the Theological Political Treatise—for instance, the rejection of 
miracles in Chapter 6 is indebted to this Epicurean idea: if nothing comes out of 
nothing, no event can be precipitated by a deity intervening into the natural course 
of things. Or, more broadly, ontologically speaking, there is no transcendence. We 
can readily see how this monist principle—that the totality can admit of nothing 
outside it—is incompatible with the Judeo-Christian metaphysics that requires 
both creation and transcendence.17
The presupposition of a totality for knowledge to be possible leads to the primacy 
of practical judgment.18 As soon as we impute a totality of being, a complete 
theoretical knowledge of that totality appears impossible. Thus, knowledge 
always begins with a practical purpose. Epicurus designates this end as tranquility. 
The word that he uses at the beginning of the letter to Herodotus is γαληνισμός, 
which is more commonly expressed in his writings as ἀταραξία (ataraxia) and its 
cognates signifying the serenity and blessedness characteristic of the wise person 
who has phronesis (see e.g. X.83, 85, and 124-125). The letter to Menoeceus says 
that such a disposition makes the wise person live “like a god amongst humans” 
(X.135). Ataraxia means literally the absence or negation of “anxiety” (τάραχος)—
and fear of death is singled out as the most detrimental anxiety in our pursuit of 
blessedness (X.81-82).
The mutual support between phronesis and ataraxia is clear. If phronesis signifies 
the balanced relation between thought and emotion in the process of making 
judgments about how to act, then ataraxia is the state of mind and body that 
results from the balanced exercise of thought and emotion characteristic of 
phronesis (X.132 and X.140). Differently put, ataraxia is the state in which we 
are free from the dominance of emotions such as fear of death that curtail our 
calculative capacity, as well as free from the illusion that the mind or the spirit can 
predominate over the body. 
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The Epicurean refusal of the separation of mind and body combines the materialism 
of monism—no transcendence and no creation—with the inseparability of 
thought and emotion characteristic of phronesis. The interconnection of thought 
and emotion entails that no body is created out of nothing and that no mind 
contains a transcendent quality. When the body dies, the mind dies with it—there 
is no immortal soul or spirit that outlives the body. This means that—as Epicurus 
puts in a phrase that was perhaps his best known in antiquity—“death … is nothing 
to us” (X.126). The reason is that, while we are alive, we should concern ourselves 
with living—as Spinoza puts it in Proposition 67, we are free when our activity “is 
a meditation on life”—and when we are dead, we feel nothing and hence death 
can no longer bother us. The fear of death, then, is a state in which our knowledge 
starts from false premises and as such derails our judgment by overwhelming 
our emotions. In other words, it derails the balance in phronesis of thought and 
emotion that ataraxia requires.
This balance between thought and emotion provides a basic conception of free 
action. Phronesis cannot accommodate the hierarchical division between spirit 
and body—the division that is the metaphysical foundation of the conception 
of the free will. Another way of expressing this idea is to say that instrumental 
rationality conceives of freedom as being free from the free will.19 This is a fundamental 
idea in Spinoza that Genevieve Lloyd and Moira Gatens express by saying that in 
Spinoza “freedom fundamentally is the emergence from the illusion of freedom—
that is, from the illusion of free will.”20 It is also noteworthy at this point that 
the Latin translation of ataraxia is “beatitudo,” usually rendered in English as 
“blessedness,” a word that plays a significant role in Part V of the Ethics, which is 
concerned, as its title discloses, with “human freedom.”
Following Epicurus, we could say that beatitudo as understood by Spinoza is 
the state that arises when one acts without being overwhelmed with the fear 
of death, but rather by exercising judgments that pertain to his living—that is, 
when one acts freely, according to Proposition 67 of Part IV of the Ethics. That 
Spinoza adopts the Epicurean position of linking phronesis and ataraxia in terms 
of overcoming the fear of death is also supported by the fact that Proposition 
67 is preceded by two propositions that essentially summarize the calculation of 
utility: Proposition 65 holds that “from the guidance of reason, we shall follow the 
greater of two goods or the lesser of two evils.” And Proposition 66 explains that 
this calculating applies not only to the present but also to the future.21 
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A difficulty arises at this point. If monism designates a totality outside of which 
nothing exists does not this entail determinism?
Even if Epicurus does not tackle this problem explicitly, his letter to Pythocles 
may be used to respond to the charge of determinism. This letter discusses 
celestial or “meteorological” phenomena (X.83), for instance, thunder, lightning, 
and eclipses. These are natural phenomena that may generate fear in us, which is 
why people have attributed them to the interference of gods. Epicurus approaches 
the discussion of these phenomena by saying that they may admit of a multiplicity 
of causes, none of which contradicts the senses (X.86). From a modern scientific 
perspective, it is inadmissible to impute multiple causes for the same natural 
occurrence. And if for Epicurus the senses were indeed the only way in which 
existence is experienced, as Hegel accuses him in his lectures on the history of 
philosophy, then such an admission of multiple causes would have constituted an 
empiricism on a weak foundation.22
Hegel’s accusation presupposes a separation of theory and practice, which is 
precisely what Epicurus seeks to deny through the primacy of practical knowledge. 
In fact, the reason why Epicurus admits of multiple causes is to defend the idea 
of a substance outside of which nothing exists and to reject creation ex nihilo as 
a way of arguing for the primacy of phronesis. There may or may not be multiple 
causes for thunderbolts, writes Epicurus almost nonchalantly, but—and that’s 
the point—“the only thing that really matters is not to lapse into myth” while 
providing an explanation (X.104). In other words, if we cannot find the single 
cause of a phenomenon, we can experiment with different causes based on sense-
experience, but we must avoid at all cost concocting divine interventions in the 
totality of nature, which only ever precipitates fear. The multiplicity of causes 
is not a theoretical point about epistemology but a point about how to avoid 
emotional surges that overwhelm us and lead to fanciful ideas about gods. In 
other words, the discourse on multiple causes points to the primacy of practical 
knowledge.
This is not to reject theoretical knowledge or to devalue it in any way. It is, rather, 
to recognize that theory is founded in practice and inseparable from it. Epicurus 
is describing a hermeneutical situation as overcoming the separation of theory 
and praxis similar to what Heidegger calls the primacy of interpretation over 
understanding—and I call the primacy of practical knowledge.
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We can put the same point starting with monism: The totality that includes 
everything is, by virtue of the fact that it includes everything, impossible to know 
completely. On certain occasions we may even be allowed to impute multiple 
causes to a natural phenomenon so as to avoid being trapped in the fear of this 
phenomenon. Instrumental rationality in this construal is the form of knowledge 
that does not simply have an epistemic function but that is the necessary 
outcome of the substance and that organizes all the various ways of being in the 
world. Ontology necessarily entails that actions take place within contingency, 
requiring the human to make practical judgments—to exercise phronesis—so as 
to act in the world. Differently put, the operation of phronesis breaks the hold of 
determinism.23
The priority of phronesis indicates that the Epicurean question is not “what is 
truth?” Rather, the question is about how we arrive at falsities. How is it that 
we err? This is an epistemological question—it asks how we can avoid errors. It 
is simultaneously an ethical question—it asks about the effects of our capacity 
to know, especially as they pertain to our wellbeing. And, finally, it is a political 
question that addresses the motivation for action—either because we are 
influenced by certain desires that drive us to error, or because falsities motivate 
us to act so as to rectify them. Note how congenial this line of thought is to 
Spinoza’s understanding of the imagination in the Theological Political Treatise. The 
imagination does not lead to truth—which is why it is about action and therefore, 
as we learn in Chapter 2 of the Treatise, the imagination “is beyond the limits of 
intellect [multa extra intellectus limites percipere]” (20/28). And that’s why it is also 
related to freedom: A universal truth does not demand any action, whereas the 
possibility of error requires action, it calls for it as a way of presenting or amending 
the error. Thus error contains within it the possibility of political freedom.
The discussion of the multiple causes of celestial phenomena indicates also that 
Epicureanism is not naturalism if by naturalism we understand that any natural 
explanation is referred to science. Phronesis precedes scientific explanation. 
But this is not humanism either, because phronesis is an effect of materiality. 
There is an hylocentricism operating here—as opposed to anthropocentrism. 
The imputation of multiple causes is, in fact, not uncommon in the materialist 
tradition. For instance, Machiavelli often draws attention to how the same actions 
do not necessarily lead to the same outcome.24 
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Overcoming the fear of death, then, suggests a theory of freedom that is 
irreducible to the free will, because it understands the mind and the body, 
emotions and thought, as inseparable. The calculation of utility or phronesis is 
the kind of practical comportment to the world that makes such a materialist 
sense of freedom possible because phronesis relies on the parallel operation of 
desire and rationality. Thus, the overcoming of the fear of death emerges as a way 
of expressing freedom as the exercise of phronesis.
3. ANTE-SECULARISM: THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORITY AND 
HUMAN NATURE IN LUCRETIUS
Freedom as overcoming the fear of death in Epicurus shows how monism and the 
calculation of utility work together, for the good life of the human. For this to be 
possible, practical knowledge or phronesis needs to take priority. Knowledge is 
never disinterested or, as we might express it today, “knowledge is power.”
It is here that the shortcoming of Epicurus arises. Despite certain incidental 
intimations, Epicurus never develops a theory of power, stopping instead at the 
designation of ataraxia as the end of action. This is a significant deficiency for 
two reasons. First, authority—the first epicurean themes—is an underdeveloped 
concept in Epicurus; and, second, the historical dimension of the dialectic of 
authority and utility is lacking. Lucretius may claim that his On the Nature of 
Things adds nothing new to his philosophical master and it is merely an attempt 
to popularize his view in Rome (5.336–37).25 But in fact it is more than that, as it 
addresses the two shortcomings we identify in Epicurus. Let me take these two 
innovations by Lucretius in turn.
At the beginning of his poem, immediately after the opening hymn to Aphrodite, 
Lucretius turns to “religio.” This is a condition that we find in Epicurus, namely, 
when we assume gods or mysterious entities to be the efficient causes of natural 
phenomena that cause us fear or anxiety. Consequently, we are “oppressed 
beneath the weight of religion [oppressa gravi sub religione]” (1.63). But this 
oppression is no longer solely an effect of the phenomena themselves. Rather, it 
is produced by those who interpret the phenomena in such a way as to gather 
power for themselves by making others obey them. Let me put this differently: 
According to Epicurus, ontologically there is nothing transcendent, since there 
is nothing outside the totality. Fear of nature creates transcendent ideas—what 
Epicurus calls “myths.” With Lucretius, transcendence is not produced solely, or 
even primarily, by natural phenomena as such. Rather, it is produced through the 
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interpretation of natural phenomena by the proponents of religion. Essentially 
this means that the practitioners of religio actively counter the operation of 
phronesis through fear. Religio appropriates instrumental rationality for itself 
and for its own ends, that is, to perpetuate its own power. Or, more succinctly, 
religio stifles freedom.  This is a significant shift because it allows for a thinking 
of authority. 
That Lucretius has auctoritas in mind when he writes religio—or that, at least, 
we can substitute one term for the other—is also shown by the fact that 
Lucretius indicates both a theological and a political source to religion, just as 
authority’s origins are theologico-political. The example that Lucretius puts 
forward for the “evil” of religio (1.101) is the sacrifice of Iphigeneia (1.80 ff.). Her 
father, Agamemnon, does not sacrifice her only because he is ill-advised about 
the reasons why the winds won’t carry his Greek army to Troy. In addition, he 
draws his justification for the sacrifice from the matrix of beliefs and practices 
instituted as religion. Thus, in religio, as the example of the sacrifice of Iphigeneia 
demonstrates, collude those who derive their authority through theological and 
through political means.26
Note that authority signifies a kind of power that is constructed and that is not 
shared—a power that is confined to priests and kings. Such an artificial power 
that is not common to all is what Spinoza calls “potestas” or constituted power. 
As Negri has demonstrated, Spinoza stages a conflict between potestas and the 
kind of power that is shared by everyone and which is creative—as opposed to 
created.27 This is the kind of power that Spinoza calls “potentia.” Let us see how 
Lucretius stages the conflict between potestas and potentia as a way of presenting 
the dialectic of authority and utility.
Lucretius writes that Epicurus took a stand against (obsistere contra, 1.67) 
religion and the misery it brought to the world.28 This consists in questioning the 
myths (fama, 1.68) about Gods as well as searching for the causes of the natural 
phenomena that provoke fear.
Therefore the lively power of his mind [vivida vis animi] prevailed, and forth 
he marched far beyond the flaming walls of the world, as he traversed the 
immeasurable universe in thought and imagination; whence victorious he 
returns bearing his prize, the knowledge what can come into being, what 
cannot, in a word, how each thing has its powers limited [finita potestas] 
and its deep-set boundary mark. (1.72-77)
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This is a complex passage. The main metaphor presents Epicurus as a powerful 
adversary that conquers religio. In parallel, there are two further metaphors 
presenting monism. First are the fiery walls that signify the end of the world, and 
the second is about the boundary mark that indicates the laws of nature that we 
as human cannot overcome—for instance, the fact that we will all die.
It is important to note the two parallel metaphorics—about the overcoming of 
religio and about monism—are possible on condition that a conception of power 
other than constituted power is presupposed. Specifically, the power (vis) that 
Epicurus has to take a stand against the oppressions of religio is not premised 
on any instituted form of power. Rather, the source of his power is that he has 
“marched” to the end of the world, or, to put the same point in the vocabulary 
of the letter to Herodotus, he has grasped the totality (τὸ πᾶν). This power that 
Epicurus employs is finite (finita potestas). It is a power that comes from his 
thought that as finite it pertains to the particular circumstances that allow for 
the emergence of that power. We can understand this power as phronesis, that is, 
as the power exercised through practical judgment and which is opposed to the 
power of authority that operates by employing fear. Thus, here the potestas of 
authority is pitted against the potentia of Epicurus’s phronesis.
From this vantage point, we may be able to explain why the expression “freedom 
to philosophize” from the subtitle is absent from the Preface—and in fact it is 
not used again until Chapter 14 of the Treatise. It is substituted by the idea of the 
freedom to judge, repeated three times in the Preface. The first use suggests that 
preventing people from making judgements freely erodes their political freedom: 
“To invest with prejudice or in any way coerce each person’s free judgment 
[liberum uniuscuiusque judicium] is altogether incompatible with public freedom 
[communi libertati]” (3/7). The freedom to judge is opposed to constituted power 
that derives its authority from “prejudices.” The second takes the same point 
further, accusing priests who “distort the true function of the Church” from 
“inhibiting everyone from judging freely [unusquisque libero suo judicio]” (4/8). 
This point could have come from Lucretius. The final use asserts that “everyone 
should be allowed freedom of judgment [unicuique sui judicii libertatem]” (6/11)—
because this freedom to judge is distinctive of human nature and of potentia, 
the kind of power that everyone has access to. We see here how Lucretius’s first 
innovation helps organize the dialectic of authority and utility in terms of power 
in the Preface.
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The second innovation that we find in Lucretius consists in highlighting the 
historical import of phronesis. If phronesis is constitutive of human nature, its 
operation cannot be confined to the here and now. It also operated in the past. 
Not only does this allow for the employment of history in the pursuit of “free 
philosophizing.” In addition, it solves a problem about the connection between 
instrumentality and teleology. Let us, now, turn to Book 5 of On the Nature of 
Things where Lucretius introduces this second innovation.
Lucretius’s theory of the stages of social formation requires an initial step, namely, 
the denial of any anthropomorphic conception of the divine as well as the denial 
of creationism: “the world was certainly not made for us by divine power” (5.198-
99). This leads to a conclusion that is familiar to readers of the Appendix to Part 
I of the Ethics. As Spinoza puts it there, “Nature has no end set before it, and … 
all final causes are nothing but human fictions.” Consequently, the “sanctuary of 
ignorance” is the belief that God has a will. The Epicureans express this also by 
saying that the gods do not care about us—their tranquility and blessedness is 
unconcerned with human affairs. 
Following upon the denial of the divine creation of the world “for us,” in Book 
5 Lucretius spends close to two hundred lines on the interconnection between 
creation and destruction. Nothing created is exempt from destruction, “even 
stones [of the gods’ temples] are conquered by time” (5.306). This mutual 
dependence of birth and death ought to be placed within the argument about the 
mutual dependence of forces of power that Lucretius developed in Book 3: “one 
thing never ceases to arise from another, and no man possesses life in freehold—
all as tenants” (3.970-71). One exists by virtue of the fact that one is inserted in a 
network of power relations. No one is absolutely free. Everybody depends upon 
the relations of power—both of potestas and of potentia—that unfold within the 
specific context one finds oneself in. Differently put, the totality consists of power 
relations that are responsible for the continuous, incessant unfolding of genesis 
and destruction, birth and death—and there is no end or meaning to this process. 
The rejection of creation ex nihilo or monism and the rejection of teleology go 
hand in hand.
The discussion of the formation of society is premised on the realization that, 
even though there is no ultimate end in this matrix of power relations, still we 
can identify particular ends that regulate behavior. Instrumental rationality or 
phronesis has no need for final causes at a metaphysical level, which is what 
allows for the operation of particular ends in history. Or, in another formulation 
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employing vocabulary from Book 1 of On the Nature of Things, we strive for 
particular ends as opposed to an ultimate end because our power is finite. We can 
find the same move in Spinoza, who rejects ultimate ends in the Appendix to Part 
I of the Ethics but admits of instrumental reasoning—the kind of reasoning that 
relies on means and ends as a way of calculating utility—in Part IV of the Ethics.29
Lucretius employs the principle that human action is premised on the finite ends 
pursued by phronesis to delineate three stages of social and political formation. 
Every epoch in the three stages of society is adumbrated by stipulating how humans 
use their instrumental rationality to respond to specific material conditions.30 
An historical analysis has recourse to phronesis to describe power relations that 
articulate the finite or particular ends—as opposed to final ends—of action. Thus 
Lucretius uses phronesis to distinguish between the three stages of society.
In the first stage of social formation life is nomadic, based on hunting, but humans 
lack a conception of the common good and do not have laws (5.925-69). Being 
close to nature, they do not fear natural phenomena and hence have no use of 
religion, but they fear the wild beasts. In the second stage, humans start living 
in settlements. At this point, Lucretius provides his account of the creation of 
language in terms of the utility (utilitas, 5.1029 and 1047) of communication. Here 
Lucretius also stipulates that property and wealth start developing, but with that 
also comes ambition (5.1132), leading to the slaying of kings and general warfare—
resembling what Hobbes calls a war of all against all. The feature that inaugurates 
the third stage is the creation of laws (5.1143-44), whose purpose is to arrest the 
violence characterizing the previous stage. The humans in this stage overcome 
the fear of violence but now they fear punishment from the law instead (5.1151).
Two features of this schema are notable. First, Lucretius extrapolates how 
instrumental rationality is based on material conditions (see, e.g., the account 
of the development of metallurgy, 5.1241 ff.). Any articulation of phronesis thus 
is historical—which is to say, finite. Second, the drive toward the preservation of 
life or conatus accounts for the transition from one stage to the next—and fear 
is the dominant emotion. Thus in the first stage humans fear for their life from 
wild animals, in the second they fear for their life through the ambitions leading 
to generalized violence, and in the third stage they fear punishment from the 
law. Consequently, the main features of each stage are thoroughly determined by 
the exercise of instrumental rationality that responds to material circumstances 
with the aim to preserve life. What characterizes the humans by virtue of being 
humans, all the way from a state of barbarism to the development of complex 
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political structures, is the fear for their lives and the drive for self-preservation.31 
This constant feature affords Lucretius a method to think about the evolution of 
society. To put this differently, history shows us that human nature consists in how 
we exercise our phronesis to overcome fear. Or, that human nature consists in the 
unfolding of the dialectic of authority and utility—where authority is understood 
as the power produced through fear.
When Spinoza links conatus to the calculation of utility (for instance in E IV, 
P20S), he makes available to himself the historical methodology that we find 
in Book 5 of On the Nature of Things. Thus, he can employ the example of the 
founding of the Hebrew state through the contribution of Moses’s authority 
not simply as an historical analogy, as is common in the newly founded Dutch 
Republic.32 Moreover, as soon as history is founded on phronesis as a distinctive 
feature of human nature, the lessons about the dialectic of authority and utility 
derived from the analysis of the Hebrew state become relevant to the present. 
Spinoza can reconstruct an instrumental logic that leads to the foundation of 
the Hebrew state by identifying the means and ends relations that were at play in 
conjunction with the various forms of power—but, crucially, without recourse to 
ultimate ends, or to transcendent entities that miraculously intervene to support 
a supposedly “elect” people (as Spinoza argues in Chapter 3 of the Theological 
Political Treatise).
A significant implication arises from Lucretius’s analysis of authority in 
conjunction with its historical articulation, one pertaining to the inseparability 
of the two sources of authority, the theological and the political. In a move that 
today would seem counter-intuitive, Lucretius locates the emergence of religio 
in the third stage of human progress (5.1161 ff.). As soon as society is politically 
organized by providing laws to protect the state and to lead to order, peace and 
stability, humans realize that they are still subject to sudden death: “when cities are 
shaken and fall or threaten to fall, what wonder if the sons of men feel contempt 
for themselves, and acknowledge the great potency and wondrous might of gods 
in the world, to govern all things?” (5.1237-40). The fear of punishment distinctive 
of the third stage is transfigured into a fear of gods as the punishers par excellence.33 
This creates the theological support for the structure of command and obedience 
that political authority relies on. Differently put, it is not religious practice as 
such that is produced in the third stage; rather, what is produced in the theologico-
political authority.
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This entails that the political and the religious are inextricable in any organized 
polity. But this is not the kind of postsecularism that has become prevalent 
the past few years, for instance through the work of Charles Taylor or Jürgen 
Habermas. The main characteristic of the recent “return to religion” presupposes 
that a separation was forged between Church and state and that contemporary 
sensibilities transverse this secular moment.34 Their aim is for postsecularism to 
point toward a pluralism sustained through reason. As opposed to this, Lucretius 
locates the genesis of religio in the creation of the political community through 
obedience to laws. The demand to obey the laws is psychologically distorted to 
create the illusion that we also need to obey the divine. This recognition of the 
theologico-political roots of authority cannot be used to defend pluralism as it is 
simply a fact of historical development. Differently put, it indicates a historical or 
finite dimension of phronesis that explains the creation of law and that lacks any 
normative traction dictating what the law ought to legislate. Since it describes how 
a distinction between religious and state law is possible, we can talk of Lucretius’s 
ante-secularism.
Instead of a normative dimension, ante-secularism fuels the dialectic of authority 
and utility. On the one hand, the production of authority as the theologico-
political conjunction is positive. This is the reason why Lucretius locates religio 
at the advanced stage of society. In the move characteristic of Epicureanism, the 
calculation of utility leads to commonality and the political structures that result 
from this can contribute to the utility of the community. The calculation of utility 
is thus necessary for the political.35 Further, the fact that the citizens obey the law 
is necessary for the law to function and reach the third stage of development in 
Lucretius’s schema. The structure of command and obedience is here positive.
On the other hand, the theologico-political authority can lead to negative 
consequences for the community when the calculation of utility is co-opted by 
those in authority to further their own purposes. Such a theologico-political 
authority can be concentrated in one person—Spinoza’s example in the Preface 
is Alexander. Or it can be split between Church and state. But this “secular” 
separation of powers is immaterial compared to the fact that the production of 
authority reunites within itself politics and religion. Obedience in a community 
relies on both political and religious motivations that may promote the ends 
of those who hold authority against the utility of the community. The negative 
articulation of authority contains within it a strong anti-authoritarian impulse.
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This double movement of authority—both required under certain conditions 
to protect the utility of the people and under other detrimental to them—is 
characteristic of the dialectic of authority and utility. And such a dialectic operates 
irrespective of a constitutional separation of Church and state, which is why 
Spinoza is ante-secular. Such an ante-secularism arises in Lucretius through the 
mobilization of the first epicurean theme—the production of authority through 
fear—in conjunction with the third epicurean theme—the operation of phronesis. 
This ante-secularism, then, complements Epicurus’s analysis of the interactions 
and interconnections between the second and the third epicurean themes.
This point is also important so as to avoid confusing Spinoza’s Epicurean position 
with the typical republican position of freedom as freedom from domination. Both 
conceptions of freedom are indeed anti-authoritarian. But there are at least two 
important differences. First, freedom from domination implies a sense of negative 
freedom that is still reliant on the free will, that is, on a separation of mind and 
body. Second, in the republican tradition the emphasis is on the construction of 
forms of legality within the framework of the legitimacy of political authority. 
Conversely, in Spinoza anti-authoritarianism unfolds at the level of phronesis, 
whereby the conflict cannot be confined at the level of legitimation; rather, the 
conflict arises from the junctures and disjunctures of authority and utility. Thus, 
even though republicanism and Epicureanism share an anti-authoritarian drive, 
it is constructed differently because of the Epicurean dialectic of authority and 
utility.
4. “FIGHTING FOR THEIR SERVITUDE AS IF FOR SALVATION”: MONARCHY 
VERSUS DEMOCRACY
The most forceful and paradoxical co-articulation of freedom and the dialectic 
of authority and utility in the Preface occurs soon after the discussion about fear 
and superstition:
Granted, then, that the supreme mystery [arcanum] of monarchism 
[monarchici], its prop and stay, is to keep men in a state of deception, and 
with the specious title of religion to cloak the fear by which they must be 
held in check, so that they will fight for their servitude as if for salvation 
[pro servitio, tanquam pro salute pungent], and count it no shame, but the 
highest honour, to spend their blood and their lives for the glorification of 
one man. Yet no more disastrous policy can be devised or attempted in a 
free state [in libera republica]. To invest with prejudice or in any way coerce 
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each person’s free judgment [liberum uniuscuiusque judicium] is altogether 
incompatible with public freedom [communi libertati]. (3/7)
The most “mysterious” feature of the dialectic of authority and utility is that in 
certain political settings, the dialectic seems to suspend itself. The people stop 
calculating their utility and thereby lose their freedom. The regime of power that 
results is monarchy. Monarchy should be taken literary—as the authority that 
incorporates both political and religious obedience. Monarch is despotism—not 
just authority but authoritarianism.36 At the same time Spinoza entertains the 
possibility of an opposed regime of power, namely, the free republic or democracy. 
Spinoza notes only one characteristic of a democratic regime—as if a regime is 
democratic if and only if it has that characteristic: namely, the capacity to judge 
freely. In other words, the exercise of phronesis that we have already seen as 
synonymous with freedom in the Epicurean tradition here becomes the necessary 
condition for democracy. With this move, the dialectic of authority and utility 
is transformed into the conflict between two regimes of power, monarchy and 
democracy. Let us explore some of the context of this move, before examining 
Spinoza’s answer to the threat of freedom posed by voluntary servitude—what 
the Treatise designates as “people fighting for their servitude as if for salvation.”
Spinoza’s insight is that even in the most abject and total state of obedience, 
the possibility persists of a re-inscription of utility. He shares this insight with 
Étienne de La Boétie, who, a century and a half before the Theological Political 
Treatise, frames the issue of voluntary servitude as follows: “how it happens that 
so many men, so many towns, so many cities, so many nations at times tolerate 
a single tyrant who has no other power than what they grant him, who has no 
other ability to harm them than inasmuch as they are willing to tolerate it, who 
could do ill to them only insofar as they would rather suffer it than oppose him. 
It is certainly quite something.” In other words, “it is the people who enslave 
themselves.”37 Voluntary servitude presupposes democracy in the sense that 
the people have more power than any other entity within the polity. This power 
consists in the capacity to calculate their interest—that is, it consists in the 
exercise of instrumental rationality. The suspension of this power produces 
tyrannical authority but its re-energizing—always a possibility—describes a 
robust anti-authoritarian impulse that shook a lot of La Boétie’s contemporaries, 
including his good friend Montagne, who thought it prudent to leave the Discourse 
on Voluntary Servitude unpublished.
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Let me express this another way: La Boétie realizes that authority does not rely on 
command but on obedience. Command on its own is useless—as anyone who has 
encountered the “no” of a young child easily realizes. Command is effective only 
so long as it is obeyed. Thus, the power of the sovereign relies on the continuous 
submission to obedience. But—and that’s La Boétie’s significant insight—the 
people actually have the capacity to calculate their utility, which may lead them 
to the conclusion that they need not obey. To put it differently, disobedience is 
the precondition of obedience.38 This means that they have more power than the 
one who relies on their obedience. The critical insight is about the calculation of 
utility: power can only be mobilized against authority through the actualization of 
instrumental rationality, that is, through phronesis.
The articulation of voluntary servitude in the Theological Political Treatise relies on 
instrumental rationality to grasp the function of obedience. This often remains 
unrecognized. At a strategic moment in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari refer 
to Spinoza’s phrase that people “fight for their servitude as if it is their salvation” 
to support the pivotal claim of their work, namely, that the forms of production 
and reproduction leading to a capitalist society rely on desire. They invoke Spinoza 
to show the paradoxical nature of desire, which consists in willingly striving for 
something that is against one’s interests.39 And yet, pace Deleuze and Guattari, 
Spinoza’s insight is not just that every rational calculation is determined by desire. 
It also moves in the opposite direction: every desire is also equally determined by 
rational calculation. There is a reciprocal movement between desire and practical 
judgment. I won’t indulge here in all the medieval debates as to what comes first, 
emotions or intellect. Aristotle was fully aware that this was the wrong question, 
when he asserts that either is possible because phronesis “may be called either 
thought related to desire or desire related to thought; and man as an originator 
of action is a union of desire and intellect.”40 This co-operation of thought and 
emotion characterizes phronesis specifically, according to Aristotle. We have 
already seen how epicureanism radicalizes the Aristotelian notion of phronesis and 
how Spinoza appropriates this radicalization. In their extrapolation of Spinoza’s 
conception of voluntary servitude, Deleuze and Guattari pay scant attention to 
the operation of phronesis in how obedience is constructed in the Treatise, and 
thereby miss the dialectic of authority and utility.
Deleuze and Guattari’s blindness to the dialectic of authority and utility is in fact 
the norm in the secondary literature. Even Frédéric Lordon, who in Willing Slaves 
of Capital makes Spinoza’s voluntary servitude resonate with the twenty-first 
century, only points to the dialectic to envisage its suspension.41 In an analysis 
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full of insightful observations, Lordon shows how obedience can be mobilized in 
all sorts of seemingly irrational ways so as to precipitate submission to capitalist 
and neoliberal forms of production and reproduction. Toward the end of the 
book, Lordon asks how it is possible to evade voluntary servitude. He points to 
Spinoza’s argument from the Political Treatise, according to which the indignation 
of the multitude is the motivating factor in resisting power when it acts against 
their interests. Indignation implies recognition of one’s predicament and a drive 
to change. There is, then, here, an intimation of the dialectic of authority and 
utility. But what does this change amount to? To the multitude regaining control 
of government in what would amount to “a second coming of sovereignty,” writes 
Lordon at the very end of the book. This solution erases the dialectic of authority 
and utility. Utility will triumph over superstition but then democracy will be 
completely absorbed within sovereignty. Besides the danger that the dialectic 
here may contain a telos, I primarily fear that the abandonment of the agonistic 
framework—the conflict of authority and utility—at this critical juncture of the 
argument contains the danger of resurrecting a revamped sense of voluntary 
servitude, one in which we are slaves by exercising our power (potestas). We are 
slaves by being rulers—not as a master and slave dialectic but as a coincidence of 
master and slave. At this point utopia becomes indistinguishable from dystopia. 
The exercise of pure utility supposedly freed from obedience is just as, if not more, 
disturbing than the surrendering of utility in the act of blind obedience—because 
voluntary servitude at least retains the prospect of resistance.
Both Deleuze and Guattari’s and Lordon’s positions stumble when the question 
arises about how to overcome voluntary servitude. The problem is that neither 
desire on its own, nor the elimination of obedience seem adequate. So what is 
Spinoza’s position? His solution is unexpected. He grants that—quoting Curtius—
“‘the multitude has no ruler more potent than superstition’” (2). But avoids the 
usual move, whereby democracy is defined by arguing that the people or the 
multitude should rise from servitude by perfecting themselves through education, 
a better political system, and so on. Instead, he accentuates the conflict between 
the two regimes of power, monarchy and democracy.42 This accentuation of the 
conflict in the dialectic of authority and utility is at the heart of what I take to be 
Spinoza’s conception of agonistic democracy.43
Let us see how Spinoza signals such a move. I am citing here the passage that 
immediately follows the one in which Spinoza determined voluntary servitude 
while distinguishing between monarchy and the free state:
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Alleged seditions [Et quod ad seditiones attinet] that are pursued under 
the cloak of religion, they surely have their only source in this, that law 
intrudes into the realm of speculative thought [leges de rebus speculativis 
conduntur], and that opinions are put on trial and condemned as crimes. The 
adherents and followers of these opinions are sacrificed, not to the public 
health/ salvation [publicae saluti], but to the hatred and savagery of their 
opponents. If under state law [ex jure imperii] “only deeds were arraigned, 
and words were not punished,” seditions of this kind would be divested of 
any appearance of legality [nulla juris specie similes seditiones ornari possent], 
and controversies would not turn into seditions [controversiae in seditiones 
verterentur]. (3/7)
This is a complex passage, not least because of Spinoza’s propensity to present 
something as self-evident, whereas in fact it may deviate from our preconceptions. 
So let us read the passage attentively.
This first point to note is that the word “seditio” is repeated three times. Seditio 
enters forcefully the vocabulary of political philosophy through Hobbes’s 
translation of Thucydides’s Histories of the Peloponnesian War. Hobbes translates 
as “seditio” the word “stasis.”44 It is well-known that stasis as civil war, or internal 
arrest, or conflict within the city denotes a negative political experience. For 
instance, Plato contrasts the glory and virtue that arises through polemos, the 
war against external enemies, with the stasis, the internal war that he describes 
as the greatest ill of the polity.45 From ancient times onward, stasis is described 
as the greatest disease of the polis.46 This assessment is still pivotal in Carl 
Schmitt’s distinction between the enemy and the foe—who is the internal enemy. 
Schmitt defines the political as the identification of the enemy, whereas the foe 
is explicitly excluded from this definition.47 Significantly, the identification of the 
internal enemy, pace Schmitt, is also a way of strengthening sovereign power, as 
the flourishing of sedition laws in the aftermath of 9/11 demonstrates.
Sedition or stasis is never accomplished by a single individual or a group of people. 
There may be an orchestrator of an internal unrest, but for that to be a threat 
to the state, the participation of the people is also required. For instance, Locke 
strongly advocates for the toleration of any opposing view, but with one exception, 
namely, when opinions that can be detrimental to the state start appealing to a 
large number of people.48 The “fickle multitude” that is swayed this way and that 
by the enemies of the state, is indispensable for sedition to be actualized. Thus, 
“seditio” signifies the worst that a state or polity can encounter and which consists 
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in the people inciting conflict with established authority. So, the word “seditio” is 
loaded with over two millennia of unanimity as to its pernicious influence on the 
state, a unanimity that is accompanied by the fear of the multitude.49 
Within the historical and conceptual context that I describe above, Spinoza’s 
discussion of “seditio” is extraordinary. He completely reverses the entire 
structure of the concept. Instead of the people precipitating sedition against 
authority, Spinoza presents authority as being seditious when it is using the 
law to suppress the free exercise of judgment. Spinoza starts by introducing 
not real but false seditions. These alleged seditions are perpetrated “under the 
cloak of religion” to the extent that religion is a vehicle of superstition advancing 
authority. Religion, as we will learn soon and as Spinoza will tirelessly repeat 
throughout the Theological Political Treatise, has a positive function that consists 
in instilling obedience as a precondition of legality (6). Authority—to repeat—
is not bad per se. But obedience, when promulgated through superstition, is 
counterpoised to the freedom to judge (4). Alleged seditions are the intrusion of 
law (and hence obedience whose negative side is superstition) into our freedom 
to judge and to calculate our utility. The effect of this is that alleged seditions will 
lead to prosecution. Differently put, authority seeks to substitute instrumental 
rationality, which is against the salus of the people—against the multitude’s utility.
The tension between authority and utility comes to a climax around the word 
salus. The word salus, meaning both health and salvation, repeats the word used in 
the expression about the people fighting for their servitude as if for their salvation 
(pro salute). So there is certainly an echo of this phrase here. At the same time, the 
medical metaphorics of the term stasis are unmistakable. As I mentioned above, 
since Plato stasis has been consistently designated as the greatest disease of the 
political. Spinoza is certainly aware of this tradition to which he responds to by 
totally subverting it. Here, the loss of health is attributed to those who seek to 
exercise authority despotically.
The reversal of the traditional understanding of stasis allows Spinoza to dramatize 
the dialectic of authority and utility leading to an understanding of democracy as 
agonistic practice. The idea of stasis, from Plato and Aristotle all the way to the 
seventeenth century, was uniformly attributed to the “fickle multitude,” whereas 
here it is attributed to those who hold political authority and evoke the law 
against those who want to exercise phronesis.50 Seditio is, according to Spinoza, an 
effect of seeking to consolidate authority by eliminating instrumental rationality 
in the name of the law. The accusation is directed primarily against authority—
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both religious and political—as is stated unambiguously a bit later: “Church and 
Court are breeding bitter factions [dissidia] which readily turn people to sedition 
[seditiones]” (5/9). This claim is repeated in Chapter 7 and further amplified in 
Chapter 14 of the Treatise. The seditious role of what Lucretius calls “religio” is 
presented in political terms that mirror the distinction between monarchy and 
democracy: sedition is the prosecuting—exercised in the service of monarchy—
of the freedom to judge. In this sense, sedition here stages the conflict between 
monarchy and democracy.
The argument concludes that if we recognize this seditious activity of monarchical 
authority, then controversies will no longer be thought of as seditions. In other 
words, democracy here is not defined through the people achieving rule. Such a rule 
is always liable to voluntary servitude when the people miscalculate their utility. 
Instead, the starting point of Spinoza’s democratic thinking is the controversies 
and conflicts (another word in Greek for this could actually be stasis) allowed 
to unfold within the polity.51 Thus, democracy is only possible if the dialectic of 
authority and utility is operative.52
The subversion of stasis performed by Spinoza is not unprecedented. The word 
“seditio” has another equally, if not more, important side. As I argue in my book 
Democracy and Violence, an alternative tradition about the function of stasis does 
exist.53 For instance, Nicole Loraux discovers the foundation of the political in 
ancient Athens precisely in stasis.54 And centuries later Machiavelli—one of the 
major if never named conversants in the Theological Political Treatise—rehabilitates 
stasis by arguing in the Discourses that the greatness of the Roman Republic was 
due to the instituted conflict between the senate and the people.55 The position I 
defend in Democracy and Violence is that such an alternative tradition is crucial for 
an understanding of democracy. Within such a genealogy of stasis, the passage we 
are dealing with here is of singular significance.
Differently put, Spinoza engages in this paragraph with a long tradition that sees 
stasis or sedition as the bane of the political—as the greatest fear of any state. 
As opposed to this tradition, Spinoza inscribes free judgment or phronesis at 
the center of the regime of power that is democratic. This means that internal 
controversies are indispensable for democracy to be possible. And yet, that 
possibility is not envisaged as an ultimate outcome that would put an end to the 
conflict with authority—that is Lordon’s deficient move. Instead, free judgment 
is counterpoised to sedition as the attempt by authority to repress judgment so as 
to institute voluntary servitude.
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Nothing in Spinoza’s passage indicates that this conflict characteristic of the 
dialectic of authority and utility can end. It does suggest, however—and this is 
fundamental in Spinoza’s conception of democracy—that monarchy cannot 
exclude that conflict and therefore that the democratic is always presupposed, 
even when it is seditiously repressed. If freedom as the overcoming of death 
consists in nothing else than the exercise of phronesis, then the political regime 
embodying this freedom is democracy, even though—or, perhaps, because—the 
threat of authority and voluntary servitude can never be eliminated.
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NOTES
1. All references to Spinoza’s Theological Political Treatise are to the translation by Samuel Shirley 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001) cited parenthetically by page number. I have often altered the 
translation. For the Latin, I have used the Opera. Ed. Carl Gebhardt. Heidelberg: Carl Winters 
Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1924. The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is contained in Volume 3. 
All page references to this edition follow after the English edition.
2. For the concept of authority in relation to the Reformation paying particular attention to the 
division between the inside and the outside of the subject as well as to the contrast between 
faith and reason, see Herbert Marcuse, A Study on Authority, in Studies in Critical Philosophy. 
Trans. Joris de Bres. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973, 49-155. For the historical context in relation to 
Biblical hermeneutics, see Susan James, Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics: The Theologi-
co-Political Treatise. Oxford: Oxford U. P., 2012; and, Samuel Preus, Spinoza and the Irrelevance of 
Biblical Authority. Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 2001.
3. Pierre-François Moreau notes this tension in the subtitle in Spinoza et le Spinozisme. Paris: PUF, 
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